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Summary findings
To address questions about how stronger patent  rights  of the fact that stronger patent protection will not apply
will affect India's pharmaceutical industry, Fink simulates  to existing drugs and that the Indian government might
the effects of introducing  such protection  - as required  be able to restrain high drug prices by imposing price
by the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-  controls or granting compulsory licenses.
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)  - on  Still, Fink concludes that if future drug discoveries are
market structure and static consumer welfare. (India  mainly new varieties of already existing therapeutic
must amend its current patent regime by 2005 and  treatments,  the effect of stronger patent protection is
establish a transitional regime in the meanwhile.)  likely to be small. If newly discovered drugs are
The model Fink uses accounts for the complex  medicinal breakthroughs, however, prices may rise
demand structure for pharmaceutical goods. Consumers  significantly above competitive levels and static welfare
can choose among various drugs available to treat a  losses may be large.
specific disease. And for each drug, they have a choice  If demand is highly price-elastic, as is likely in India,
among various differentiated brands.  profits for transnational corporations are likely to be
Fink calibrates the model for two groups of drugs - small. But if private health insurance is permitted  in
quinolonnes and synthetic hypotensives - using 1992  India, reducing the price-sensitivity of demand, patent-
brand-level data. In both groups, a subset of all available  holders' profits could increase substantially. In light of
drugs was patent-protected  in Western Europe but not  the fact that the TRIPS Agreement strengthens patent
India, where Indian manufacturers freely imitated them.  rights in most developing countries, pharmaceutical
The simulation analysis asks how the market structure  companies may do more research on, for example,
for the two groups of drugs would have looked if India  tropical diseases.
had granted patents for drugs. It does not take account
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The protection of patent rights is considered to be a critical precondition for private
investment in pharmaceutical research and in the development of new drugs. The importance of
patent protection in this industry can be attributed to the ease with which new chemical entities
can be imitated in comparison with the large R&D outlays and long product cycles associated
with research-based drugs. To put it in economic terms, new chemical entities-unless  legally
protected by patents-are  weakly appropriable from the viewpoint of the innovating firm.
The origins of the pharmaceutical industry go back to the commercialization of the first
research-based drugs, Prontosil and Penicillin, in the 1930s. Since the 1960s, the development
and production of pharmaceuticals has been dominated by a limited number of transnational
corporations (TNCs) from developed countries (mostly from the United States, Germany,  the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, and Japan).  Despite the escalating costs of R&D, a
declining rate of new drug development, the expiry of patents on many blockbuster drugs in the
late 1980s, and the squeezing of public health budgets, the composition of the global
pharmnaceutical  industry has largely remained the same up to the early 1990s (Tarabusi, 1993).'
Pharmaceutical companies have extensive international production systems.  U.S. pharmaceutical
TNCs, for example, have, on average, 33.8 foreign affiliates per parent firm-a  larger number
than in any other U.S. manufacturing industry (Maskus, 1998). This pattern fits well into the
ownership-location-intemalization framework (OLI) of international production:  TNCs are firms
with significant knowledge-based assets-patents,  trademarks, and marketing expertise in the
case of the pharmaceutical industry-which  are internationally often most profitably exploited by
taking a direct investment position in a foreign country (Dunning, 1979 and 1981).
This paper examines the impact of patent protection on the behavior of pharmaceutical
TNCs and market structure in India, which has traditionally been a fierce opponent of stronger
intellectual property rights.  The Indian Patents Act of 1970 specifically excludes patent coverage
' Starting  in  the late 1980s,  the new research  tools  unleashed  by the science  of molecular  genetics  have
fundamentally  altered  the pharmaceutical  R&D  process  and  have  provoked  a large  number  of mergers  and  buy-outs,
thus changing  the traditional  picture  of the industry.
2for pharmaceutical products. To meet its obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-one  of the outcomes of the Uruguay trade round (1986-
94)-India  will have to amend its patent laws to allow for pharmaceutical product patents by
2005.  The signing of the TRIPS Agreement by the Indian Government has been accompanied by
forceful publicity predicting that stronger patent rights will lead to soaring prices for
pharmaceuticals and to a dominance of TNCs by 'wiping-out' Indian firms.  This study is
intended to shed some light on these issues and may also serve as a reference point for other
developing countries introducing pharmaceutical product patents in a 'post-TRIPS' world.
The method of analysis is the calibration of a theoretical model to actual data from the
Indian pharmacy market and a simulation exercise to answer the hypothetical question of what
the market structure would be if India allowed patents for pharmaceutical products.  This
technique is in the same spirit as the studies by Baldwin and Krugman (1988) on the U.S. and
Japanese semiconductor industries and by Dixit (1988) on the U.S. and Japanese automobile
industries, which focus on the simulation of alternative trade policy regimes.
The model developed for the simulation analysis explicitly accounts for the complex
demand structure for pharmaceutical goods that results from the presence of therapeutic substitute
drugs and the practice of drug manufacturers  to differentiate  their products through the use of
trademarks and advertising.  Consumer demand is represented by a three-level utility function,
whereby preferences for different chemical entities and brands are characterized by constant-
elasticity-of-substitution functions. In the absence of patent protection, firms are assumed to
maximize profits taking as constant the sales of other market participants. If patents are
protected, the patent holder has a monopoly for the chemical entity, but still competes with
producers of therapeutic substitutes.
This model is calibrated for two therapeutic groups-quinolonnes  and synthetic
hypotensives-using  1992 brand-level data for each chemical entity sold in the two therapeutic
groups which would have received patent protection in Europe (referred to as 'on-patent'
chemical entities throughout this study), as well as brand-level data for all 'off-patent' chemical
entities in these two groups. The simulations reveal to what extent price increases, profits, and
3static consumer welfare losses depend on the values of the model's parameters and provide
valuable insights with regard to the role of competition among therapeutic substances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews India's current patent
regime and its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical processes
and products.  Based on this review, Section III describes the development of India's
pharmaceutical industry and outlines the industry's main features. Accounting for these features,
Section IV develops a partial equilibrium model of the Indian pharmacy market by specifying
demand and supply behavior of consumers and producers of drugs. Section V describes the
brand-level data used for the empirical investigation. Section VI explains how the partial-
equilibrium model is calibrated to these data. Section VIi illustrates the simulation procedure and
Section VIII discusses the simulation results.  Section IX summarizes the paper's main findings
and puts these findings into perspective.
II.  India's patent regime
The Indian Patents Act of 1970
The Indian patent system is governed by the Indian Patents Act of 1970 (which became
effective in 1972). It specifically excludes patent coverage for pharmaceutical products and only
admits process patents for a period of 7 years (or five years from the date of sealing the patent,
whichever is shorter). With respect to process patents, there are four provisions which
substantially limit the scope of protection. First, after three years from the date of sealing a
pharmaceutical process patent, the 'License of Rights' clause applies. Under this clause, the
patent owner is obliged to license the patented process to any interested party, with a maximum
royalty of 4 percent payable by the licensee. Second, after three years from the date of sealing a
pharmaceutical patent, the government can grant a compulsory license, if the patented product is
not available at 'reasonable' prices or other public interests are not satisfied.  The terms of a
compulsory license are set by the government, unless the patent owner and licensee find
agreement between themselves. Third, a patented pharmaceutical process must be worked in
India within three years from the date-of sealing the patent.  Importation of a drug produced with
4the patented process is not considered as working the patent.  Fourth, the burden of proof in case
of patent infringement rests with the patent owner.
In essence, the India Patents Act gives only very limited protection to research-based
pharmaceutical companies. Imitating firms only have to avoid patented processes to copy a
newly developed drug.  It is, however, in most cases very easy to modify or circumvent a
patented process in order to avoid infringement. Without product patents, protection of new
drugs is very limited. Moreover, because of the various restrictions related to process patents
outlined above, protection is even further reduced. 2
The TRIPS Agreement
Patent protection in the Indian pharmaceutical industry is bound to be revised. India, as
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has to comply with the provisions set forth in
the TRIPS Agreement. 3 The main provisions of TRIPS as they relate to pharmaceutical patents
can be sumrnarized as follows. Among the general obligations, Articles 3 and 4 of TRIPS require
member governments to apply the principles of national treatment, i.e. equal treatment of
nationals and non-nationals, and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, i.e. equal treatment of
foreigners regardless of their country of origin. 4 With respect to patents, Article 27.1 of TRIPS
states that "[...] patents shall be available for any invention, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology [...]," which clearly encompasses pharmaceutical products. Moreover, "[...]
patents shall be available [...] whether products are imported or locally produced," which means
that importation counts as working the patent.  Article 31 addresses the use of patented subject
matter without the authorization of the rights holder, e.g., through compulsory licenses. Although
it ties such unauthorized use to specific conditions, legal interpretations of Article 31 vary and it
has been argued that national governments have some leeway in designing rules regulating the
2 In fact, most pharmaceutical  TNCs  have  not applied  for process  patents  in India. Redwood  (1994)
reports  evidence  that  of the 20 pharmaceutical  process  patents  filed in China,  only  one was filed  in India. Poor
patent  administration  in India  has most  likely  contributed  to this difference.
3 The text  of the TRIPS  Agreement  is available  at the web-site  of the World  Trade  Organization  at
<http://www.wto.org>.
4 It should  be noted that  national  and  most-favored-nation  treatment  must  be extended  only  to other
members  of the World  Trade  Organization.
5grant of compulsory licenses (Watal, 1998b). Article 33 sets a uniform minimum term of patent
protection of 20 years counted from the filing date. Article 34.1 specifies that the burden of proof
in case of process patent infringement rests with the defendant, i.e. the party accused of patent
infringement. Finally, Article 41.1 requires member governments to "[...] ensure that
enforcement procedures [...] are available under their national laws so as to permit effective
action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights [...]" and Article 62.2
obligates  members  to "[...] ensure that the procedures  for grant  or registration  [...] permit  the
granting or registration of the right within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid unwarranted
curtailment of the period of protection." 5
The provisions of TRIPS became applicable to all signatories by the beginning of 1996.
However, Articles 65.2 and 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement entitle developing countries to a four-
year transition period in implementing all obligations (except for obligations pertaining to
national and MFN treatment) and an additional five-year transitional period for product patents in
fields of technology that were not protected at the date of application of the Agreement.
Accordingly, India will have to amend its patent law to allow for the grant of phannaceutical
product patents by 2005.6 Article 70.3 does not require member countries to extend protection to
subject matter in existence before the introduction of a new law, i.e. patent protection would not
apply retroactively.'  Articles 70.8 and 70.9, however, also specify that members should "[...]
provide [...] a means for which patents for [pharmaceutical  and agricultural chemical products]
can be filed" (this 'means' is often referred to as a 'mail-box').  Moreover, for such 'mail-box'
applications  "[...] exclusive  marketing  rights shall be granted  [...] for a period  of five years after
obtaining market approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that
Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that [...] a patent application has been filed and a
patent granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in such other
Member."  To the extent that exclusive marketing rights related to 'mail-box' applications and
5 Articles 42-61 of TRIPS further prescribe detailed rules and legal remedies to ensure adequate
enforcement of rights.
6Note  that an 'upgrade' of India's process patent system toward TRIPS compliance is already required by
2000.
6exclusive rights conferred by a regular patent title are practically the same (Watal, 1998b),
Articles 70.8 and 70.9 effectively offset the transition period with regard to pharmaceutical
product patents.
Initial efforts to establish the 'mail-box' for patent applications for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products failed to pass the Indian legislature. Accordingly, this matter was
taken to the WTO dispute settlement body by both the European Union and the United States.
The WTO Appellate Board finally ruled that India has failed to take the necessary actions to
implement its 'mail-box' obligations and recommended "[...] that the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body requests India to bring its transitional regime for patent protection of pharmaceutical [...]
products into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement." 8 Consequently, new
legislation to establish the 'mail-box' facility was passed by the Indian Parliament in early 1999.
However, a proposed amendment to the 1970 Patents Act to extend patent protection to
pharmaceutical products has, so far, failed to pass the legislature.
III.  Industry structure
One of the stated objectives of the Indian Patents Act of 1970 was the development of an
independent Indian pharmaceutical industry. The abolition of pharmaceutical product patent
protection from the inherited British colonial law was seen as the key element in advancing this
objective.  Looking at the pure numbers, the Indian Patents Act was a 'success'.  The number of
supplying firms increased from 2,237 licensed drug manufacturers in 1969-70 to an estimated
16,000 producers in 1992-93 (OPPI, 1994a). The production of drug formulations grew at an
average annual rate of 14.4 percent between 1980-81 and 1992-93; the negative balance of trade
7 Such 'past subject matter' would also include drugs not yet marketed, but already past the patent
publication stage in the development pipeline in other countries.
8 The report of the panel on the India 'mail box' dispute is available at the web-site of the World Trade
Organization at <http://www.wto.org>.
7in bulk drugs and drug formulation that prevailed throughout the 1970s and 1980s was turned
into a trade surplus by 1990.9
The period 1970-1993 also saw a declining market share of TNCs in India. In 1970,
Indian-owned firms held a share of only 10-20 percent of the total pharmacy market, TNCs
accounted for the remaining 80-90 percent. By 1980, Indian firms and TNCs had an equal share
of about 50 percent; by 1993, Indian firms had raised their share to 61 percent.' 0 Redwood
(1994) argues that the relative decline of TNCs in the Indian pharmacy market has been against
the international trend: most other countries have seen the relative share of TNCs rise at the
expense of locally owned firms."
It is, of course, difficult to attribute the falling market share of TNCs directly to the
abolition of product patent protection through the Indian Patents Act.  Other factors may have
also contributed to this trend.  Investment and ownership restrictions under the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA) may have discouraged many TNCs from investing in India. Severe price
controls on segments of the pharmaceutical markets may have reduced the prospects of
profitability. Moreover, it is possible that low Indian prices could have leaked to other markets,
either in the form of parallel imports or through price controls in foreign markets tied to reference
indices of prices in other markets (such as India). These factors may have caused some TNCs to
shun the Indian market. However, given the critical role of product patent protection for
research-based pharmaceuticals, it seems reasonable to at least in part attribute the relative
decline of TNCs to the Indian Patents Act.
'  In 1992-93,  the production  of drug formulations  was  valued at about  US$  2.13 billion,  exports  were
about  US$ 544  million  and imports  were approximately  US$  482  million. See  OPPI  (1994a).
'  These  numbers  are taken  from Redwood  (1994)  and  are based  on data from the Operations  Research
Group  (ORG}-the same  source  of data underlying  this study's investigation.  As will  be further  explained  in
Section  V, the figures  do not include  the unaudited  Indian  small  company  sector  and the Indian  government  sector,
including  hospital  and  military  markets. This  causes  a downward  bias in  the market  shares  of local firms. Redwood
(1994)  conjectures  that, in 1993,  the true market  share  of Indian  firms  was  probably  70  percent. It is also  worth
pointing  out  that in 1971,  only  two  Indian-owned  firms  were  among  the top-ten  companies  in the Indian  market  (in
terms  of sales value),  whereas  in 1992,  six Indian-owned  firms  ranked  among  the top-ten. See Lanjouw  (1997)  and
Redwood  (1994).
" It is worth  pointing  out,  however,  that  in Argentina,  which  only introduced  pharmaceutical  product
patents  in  the 1990s,  the market  share  of locally  owned  companies  increased  from 45 percent  in 1975  to 58 percent
in 1988  (Fundaci6n  de Investigaciones  Econ6micas  Latinoamericanas,  1990).
8This proposition is supported by the fact that the imitation and production of drugs
protected by patents in other countries has indeed been a widespread activity among Indian-
owned firms.  Redwood (1994) estimates that 20 percent of the brands marketed by the 15
leading Indian firms in 1993 were based on chemical entities that were covered by
pharmaceutical product patents in Europe and a further 37 percent were based on chemical
entities of which the patent had expired somewhere between 1972 and 1993. It is worth noting
that Indian firms required no formal technical assistance from abroad to produce foreign patented
drugs. The published patent title provided sufficient information to imitate the newly developed
chemical entity.  This has been attributed to a well-developed chemical infrastructure and process
skills of the local Indian pharmaceutical industry.
Copied brands of drugs patented in foreign countries have typically been introduced in
the Indian market soon after the world introduction of these drugs (Lanjouw, 1997). TNCs thus
did not enjoy a substantial first mover advantage in selling a newly developed drug on the Indian
market.  This fact has most likely contributed to the trend that many TNCs chose not to supply
the Indian market in the first place.  Indeed, in 1993, of the world's largest 30 pharmaceutical
TNCs, only 16 had a direct investment position in India (Redwood, 1994).
Expenditure on R&D by pharmaceutical companies in India has been modest.  In 1992-
93, the industry spent an estimated 1.4 per cent of sales on R&D-as  against 1 per cent of sales
by Indian industry in general (OPPI, 1994a) and against more than 15 percent of sales by the
parent groups of TNC subsidiaries (Redwood, 1994). Most R&D activity by Indian-owned firms
has concentrated on imitating and adapting pharmaceutical products developed in foreign
countries. Only very little R&D by Indian firms has been geared toward the development of new
drugs." 2 There has been no marked difference in R&D spending between Indian-owned firms and
the subsidiaries of TNCs. Foreign-owned companies relied heavily on product and process
technologies supplied by their parent groups and conducted little original R&D.
Profitability in the Indian pharmaceutical industry has continuously declined from an
estimated 15.5 percent of sales (before tax) in 1969-70 to 1 percent in 1991-92 (OPPI, 1994a).
12 Lanjouw (1997) reports that during 1975-95 only 65 of approximately 100,000 U.S. patents related to
drug and health innovations were granted to Indian inventors.
9Redwood (1994) reports evidence from a sample of Indian and foreign-owned companies which
suggests that profitability has been higher for pharmaceutical exports, but confirmns  that in the
early 1  990s, home sales of pharmaceutical companies in India were doing little better than
breaking even. Moreover, Redwood finds no marked difference between the profitability of
Indian firms and foreign-owned companies.
The absence of patent protection for pharmaceutical products, the large number of
supplying units, the low degree of profitability, and very low drug prices in India by
'international standards' could be taken as an indication for a highly competitive market.  While
this seems a plausible scenario, one should be careful in drawing premature conclusions solely
based on these descriptive indicators. There are many well-known problems related to the
comparison of prices from different countries quoted in different currencies." 3 In addition, not all
market participants directly compete with each other. The market for antibiotics, for example,
can be considered as being independent of the market for, say, cardiovasculars. Competition is
limited to a group of drugs that are therapeutic substitutes for each other. Finally, pharmaceutical
companies in India, as in developed countries, differentiate their products through trademarks and
promote their brands through advertising, thus generating market power even though a large
nuumber  of other brands of the same drug may be available (Lanjouw, 1997). The model
developed in the next section accounts for these special features of the pharmaceutical industry.
IV.  The model setup
Several studies are available that simulate the impact of patent protection on prices and
welfare in developing countries' phannaceutical industries (Nogu6s 1993, Maskus and Konan,
1994, and Subramanian, 1995). These studies rely on aggregate data on the patent protected
segment of the pharmaceutical market and simulate the transition toward a patent-induced
monopoly by making various assumptions on the pre-patent market structure and market
" One popular and often-cited comparison of drug prices has been between India and Pakistan. Keayla
(1994), for example, finds substantially higher prices in Pakistan (converted into Indian Rupees using a market
exchange rate) than in India and attributes this difference to the absence of patent protection for pharmaceutical
products in India.  The causality is unlikely to hold in this case, however, because Pakistan also did not accept
product patents during the period of comparison (Watal, 1998a).
10demand.' 4 However, they can only give rough estimates of the impact of patent protection as they
do not take into account the independence of different therapeutic groups and the different market
structures that may exist in these therapeutic groups.
Watal (1998a) improves upon these studies by using brand-level data for all on-patent
chemical entities on the Indian pharmacy market and simulating  the transition toward a patent-
induced monopoly for each on-patent chemical entity. Brands of the same entity are assumed to
be perfect substitutes and, in the absence of patent protection, market participants engage in
Cournot-Nash competition.  Watal's study considers both a linear and a constant elasticity
demand function and links the assumed demand elasticity to the level of therapeutic competition
expressed by the market share of the chemical entity in the overall therapeutic group.
Watal' s simulated price increases and welfare losses are, to date, the most detailed
figures available for the Indian market.  However, the study's methodology can be criticized on
two grounds. First, the assumption that brands of the same chemical entity are perfect substitutes
seems at odds with the observed pattern of product differentiation through trademarks and
advertising described in the previous section." 5 Second, the market share of a chemical entity in
the overall therapeutic group may not be a good indicator of the level of therapeutic competition
faced by this entity.  The degree to which one drug can be substituted by another is likely to
depend on the therapeutic properties of these drugs rather than on the revealed market share.
The partial equilibrium model developed in this section addresses these issues. It seeks
to capture the specific features of the Indian pharmaceutical industry as described in the pri.-vious
section. Market demand is modeled by a three-level utility function that accounts for therapeutic
substitution and product differentiation. In the absence of patent protection, firms are assumed to
maximize profits taking as constant the sales of other market participants. If patents are
4 Nogues (1994) assumes a perfectly competitive pre-patent market structure.  Maskus and Konan (1994)
assume that in the absence of patents a dominant foreign-owned firm competes with a domestic fringe industry.
Subramanian (1995) uses an upper bound scenario (perfect competition) and a lower bound scenario (duopoly) as
alternative pre-patent market structures.
,s In fact, in an earlier version of this paper, I tried to simulate the impact of patent protection using a
model that also treated brands of the same chemical entity as perfect substitutes and assumed Cournot-Nash
behavior.  This approach was abandoned, because this model could only be brought into consistency with the data if
one assumed unrealistically low demand elasticities.
11protected, the patent holder has a monopoly for the chemical entity, but still competes with
producers of therapeutic substitutes.
Demand for Drugs
Modeling the demand for pharmaceutical goods is quite a complex task.  Standard
economic theory assumes that the decision to purchase a good, to make the payment, and then to
consume it are undertaken by one person.  For pharmaceuticals, however, this is hardly ever the
case. Indeed, this decision may involve as many as four different persons: the doctor, who
chooses and prescribes the drug; the pharmacist, who may choose among branded or generic
substitutes; the insurer, who may pay in full or for a portion of the drug; and the patient, who
consumes the drug and may additionally influence the choice of drug and make partial or full
payment.  The details of this decision-making process vary from country to country and depend
on various institutional and economic circumstances, such as the freedom of the doctor to
prescribe the drug he finds most suitable for the patient, policies which may encourage generic
substitution, the availability and design of health insurance plans, and the patient's income.
We model the decision to purchase a pharmaceutical good as a two-stage decision-
making process as illustrated in Figure 1. First, a decision has to be made on a particular
chemical entity to fight the patient's disease. This choice usually rests with the doctor who
prescribes the chemical entity. Although no two different chemical entities have exactly the same
effect, there are therapeutic substitutes which fight the same disease. Unless the doctor makes his
decision for a particular drug on a purely medical basis, the prices of different substitutes may
influence the doctor's choice of which chemical entity to prescribe. In this decision, the doctor is
influenced by the patient's means. Once a particular chemical entity has been prescribed, a
second decision has to be made on the particular brand supplying this chemical entity." 6 This
16 Note  that  the term 'branded drug' differs  in the Indian  context  from 'branded  drugs' in developed
country  markets. In developed  countries,  a branded  drug often  refers  to the patented  product  first  introduced  in the
market. Generic  drugs typically  refer  to copies  of products  of which  the patent  has expired. This  terminology  is
sometimes  confusing,  as generic  drugs  may  have  a brand  name,  protected  by a trademark. Because  India  does  not
protect  product  patents,  there are only  generic  drugs on the market,  but generic  drug producers  generally  prefer  to
differentiate  their products  with  brand  names.
12decision is either made by the doctor, the pharmacist, and/or the patient.' 7 It is primarily
influenced by the patient's budget and brand loyalty induced by marketing and advertising, as
well as by past experience.
Formally, we model this two-stage decision-making  process is modeled by a three-level
utility function. Upper tier preferences of a representative patient are represented by a quasi-
linear utility function:
u(X,  Y)  =  aX(£l/  +  b  Y,  a,b  > O,(1
where X corresponds to a subutility level derived from all the chemical entities that are available
to fight a particular disease, Y  is a bundle of other goods and services, and a and b are functional
parameters. The subutility X is determined by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function
of chemical entities in the therapeutic group:
n  1 /P  n
X= '  v Xf'j  ,  vi=1,  p<l,  (2)
where Xi corresponds to a 'sub-subutility' level derived from all the brands supplying chemical
entity i, n is the number of chemical entities available in the therapeutic group, vi are distribution
parameters that permit the relative importance of chemical entities to vary, and p  is the
substitution parameter. As is well known for CES functions, the elasticity of substitution a-
between any pair of chemical entities is given by o=  1/ (1  - p).  The third level of the utility
function relates the sub-subutility Xi to all brands supplying chemical entity i-again  using a
CES function:
Xi  w  WVxJ  wi  = 1, a  <1,  (3)
j=0  i=O
''  Lanjouw (1997) reports evidence that Indian patients exhibit a strong influence on the choice of drugs
and that it is generally easy to obtain prescription-only drugs without scripts.
13where X,  is the output of brandj for chemical entity i, m, + 1 is the number of brands supplying
chemical entity i, wj  are distribution parameters that permit the relative importance of brands to
vary, and  5i is the substitution parameter." 8 The substitution elasticity Oi  between any pair of
brands is given by  1' = 1  / (1-  -i  ).  We would expect that qi > o,  as brands of the same chemical
entity are better substitutes for each other than chemical entities of a given therapeutic group.
This three-level utility function captures the fact that not only are different chemical
entities imperfect substitutes for one another, but also that brands of the same chemical entity are
imperfect substitutes due to experience, trademarks, and promotional activities. The model
imposes four restrictions on drug preferences. First, marginal rates of substitution between any
two chemical entities are independent of the quantity consumed of other goods and services. To
put it differently, the consumer's upper tier preferences are separable from the preferences for
chemical entities once a choice on the therapeutic group has been made.  Second, marginal rates
of substitution between any two brands of the same chemical entity are independent of the
consumed quantity of brands of different chemical entities (separability of middle tier
preferences). Third, elasticities of substitution between any two brands of the same chemical
entity are the same and are constant. Fourth, the elasticity of substitution between any two
chemical entities is the same and is constant. These restrictions seem mild in relation to the
complexity of the overall demand structure.
Because preferences at each level are separable, we can solve the consumer's problem of
maximizing the utility function implied by (1) to (3) subject to the usual budget constraint in
stages.  At the therapeutic group level, the quasi-linear utility function in (1) implies a constant-
elasticity overall demand function:
D = kP`  7  k(a(£-1))(4)
18 As will become  clear when  modeling  the supply  side,  it is convenient  to introduce  mi+1  brands,  as it
facilitates  the distinction  between  the patent  holder's brand  (brand  0) and the brands of mi  Indian imitators.
14where P is a price index for the therapeutic group and Py is a price index of other goods and
services. For the subutility function (2) and the sub-subutility function (3), maximization yields
the following demand functions for a chemical entity, Di, and for a brand, D :'9
(pi
Di= viD(-p)  (5)
Duj  = wDi  D  - (6)
where P, is a price index for chemical entity i, and P., is the product price for brandj of chemical
entity i.  Substituting (4) and (5) into (6) gives:
Dyw  = wjvUkPae--  POP-`,-O,  (7)
which represents the demand function perceived by a firm supplying brandj of chemical entity i.
Supply of Drugs
The production of a drug formulation typically consists of the transformation of an
intermediate input in the form of one or more bulk drugs into tablet or liquid form, plus
packaging and labeling. Bulk drugs are either produced in-house, purchased locally from an
Indian firm, or imported from another country. There do not seem to be significant economies of
scale related to the production of drug formulations (Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, 1991).
Hence, it is assumed that drug-producing  firms face constant marginal costs.  This assumption is
convenient, as one can ignore firms' export decisions.
Consider the market for chemical entity i in a given therapeutic group and let us initially
assume that there is no patent protection for pharmaceutical products in India.  There are then two
types of firms that contemplate entering the market for i. The TNC, which invented the chemical
'9 For a derivation of these demand functions, see Armington (1969).
15entity, supplies brand 0, while Indian imitators supply m, competing brands. In line with actual
ownership patterns (see Section V), we allow for the possibility that firms supply more than one
brand of chemical entity i or brands of other chemical entities in the therapeutic group.
Regarding market behavior, we assume that firms maximize profits taking as constant the sales of
other market participants.  The appendix shows that this leads to the first order conditions
l-(Sij  +Sik)  (SYj+ZSik)(l-td)-j:S1t1  (SV  +Zsik)ti  +jS1.tl
Pi  I  a  k  k  I  <C  (8)
for j  =  0,1,...,m,  and i =1,...,n,  where
S=  Py Dyj
U  =







are brandj's  and drug i's market shares, respectively, and c,  is the marginal cost of producing
brandj.  The index k includes all other brands of chemical entity i that are supplied by the firm
that supplies brandj.  Similarly, the index I includes all other chemical entities for which the firm
that supplies brandj of chemical entity i produces a brand and the market share s,*  relates to
exactly this brand.
Intuitively, the second term in the bracket in (8) captures firms' recognition that they can
induce consumers to switch to their brands from other brands, the third term captures the
influence of therapeutic substitution on firms' sales decision, and the final term captures the
impact of overall market demand on this decision.
16Note that (8) holds with equality only if the output of firmj is positive. In particular, it
may be that the patent owner of i is not active in the Indian market in the absence of patent
protection-indeed  this is the case for the drugs analyzed in this study. In this case, the model
assumes that the market is served entirely by local firms and output in equilibrium is determined
by competition among Indian firms only. This, in turn, assumes that the absence of the patent
owner in the Indian market does not pose an obstacle to imitation of a chemical entity.  As
explained in the preceding section, this scenario seems to be a realistic description of the
observed pattern:  the patent title published abroad provides sufficient information for Indian
firms to imitate a newly developed chemical entity. If an on-patent drug is not introduced in
India, it is only because of low market demand and can for the purposes of this model be
ignored. 20
We assume that the TNC faces fixed cost Fio to enter the Indian market for chemical
entity i and all Indian firms face fixed entry costs F,.  With otherwise unrestricted entry into the
industry, the number of Indian firms is endogenously determined by the structure of fixed and
marginal costs in the imitating industry.  As pointed out in Section III, actual profitability in the
Indian industry is small.  This is consistent with the present model if firms' operating surpluses
are largely absorbed by their fixed costs. Section VI will calibrate this model to the firm-level
data from the Indian pharmacy market.
In Section VII, we will simulate the effect of patent protection by assuming that the
patent holders' brands will take over the markets for all on-patent chemical entities. Setting
S=  1, the second term in the bracket in (8) drops out, and it is apparent that the TNC's sales
decision depends only on the degree of therapeutic competition and on overall market demand.
To put it differently, if patent rights are protected, the TNC has a monopoly at the level of the
chemical entity, but still competes with substitute chemical entities. In contrast to the calibrated
equilibrium, we will take the number of Indian firms in the off-patent market segment as
exogenously given and base our simulation on the same brands and ownership patterns oberved
20 By definition, there is no patent holder for off-patent chemical entities.  In this case the market is served
by Indian  firms  only. If a patent  on a chemical  entity  has expired  and the former  patent  holding  TNC is active in  the
Indian market, this TNC can, for the purpose of this model, be treated as an Indian firm.
17in the calibrated equilibrium. 2"  Of course, it would have been more realistic to allow for the
possibility of entry or exit in the off-patent market segment, but this was ruled out by the lack of
data on the fixed cost structure among Indian firms.
V. The data
The data used for the calibration of the model developed in the previous section come
from the ORG pharmacy audit of December 1992 (Operations  Research Group, 1993).22  The
ORG pharmacy audit does not cover the very small company sector and sales to hospitals and the
public sector (e.g., sales to the military). Watal (1996) conjectures that the unaudited share of the
total pharmaceutical market is likely to be lower in India than in the United States, where it is
estimated to be 11 percent.  Although the basis for this conjecture is not clear, it seems reasonable
to assume that the share of the pharmaceutical market unaudited by ORG is small (in any case,
brand-level data for the small company sector and sales to hospitals and to the public sector were
not available). Moreover, in terms of the model used in this study, the exclusion of the hospital
market and government procurement may actually be an advantage, as these market segments
may exhibit a different demand behavior than the one assumed in Section IV.
Redwood (1994) identifies 24 chemical entities from 13 different therapeutic groups,
which were among the Top-500 pharmaceutical products on the Indian pharmaceutical market in
1993 and which were under active patent protection in Europe. 23 Using the ORG classification,
the Indian Pharmaceutical Guide (1997), Drug Index (1997), and Current Index of Medical
Specialities (1998), one could identify all brands/firms for each on-patent chemical entity, all off-
patent therapeutic substitutes in the respective  therapeutic groups, and the brands for each off-
patent chemical entity.  I then chose two of the 13 therapeutic groups-quinolones  and synthetic
21 Note that ownership  patterns  remain  only  unchanged  as far as off-patent  chemical  entities  are
concerned. Indian firms lose, of course, ownership of brands of on-patent chemical entities in the simulated
equilibrium.
22 I would like to thank Jayashree Watal for granting me access to the ORG data.
23 According to Redwood (1994), the Top-500 pharmaceutical products represented 67.7 percent by value
of the total pharmacy market audited by ORG. Brands based on the 24 on-patent chemical entities accounted for
sales of Rs 3,280 million or 10.9 percent of the total sales values of the Top-500 products in 1993.
18hypotensives-for  the calibration and simulation exercises. 24 The choice of these two therapeutic
groups was guided by two factors. First, all chemical entities under investigation had to be free
of price controls. 25 For example this led to an exclusion of Antipeptic ulcerants (with 3 on-patent
chemical entities) as the prices of Ranitidine, one of the best-selling drugs on the Indian
pharmacy market in 1992, were controlled (see Redwood, 1994). Second, for these two
therapeutic groups, the number of (imitating) brands supplying each on-patent chemical entity
was large and there was an ample number of chemical entities. Hence, the effects of patent-
induced monopolies and the role of therapeutic substitution are likely to be important in the two
therapeutic groups chosen.
Using the Merck Index (1989), the patent owners for each on-patent chemical entity in
the two therapeutic groups was identified. In all cases, it was found that the patent owner did not
supply the Indian market.  The absence of the patent owner may have been due to two factors:
either the title holder did indeed decide to abstain from the Indian market or the title holder was
active through a licensee. Since no information could be obtained on licensing relationships, it
was assumed that the patent owner decided to abstain from the Indian market. 26 This assumption,
of course, could lead to a potential bias if licensing had been a widely used method of serving the
Indian market for the six on-patent chemical entities. At the same time, it could be argued that
potential royalties and license fees may have been small precisely because product patent
protection had not been available.
For each brand name, the ORG data list total sales revenue and quantity sold, from
which the brand's average market price could be computed. In two instances, it was found that
24 In deciding  which  set of chemical  entities  constitutes  a therapeutic  group,  the ORG classification  was
used.
25 The Indian  government  has made  wide  use  of Drug  Price  Control  Orders  (DPCOs)  to keep prices  for
medicines  low. Fixed  price  ceilings  would  lead  to a different  market  behavior  of drug  producers  than the one
assumed  in Section  VI. Fink  (1999),  for example,  demonstrates  that  price  ceilings  do not lead to a unique  Nash
equilibrium  if the TNC's and imitators'  goods  are perfect  substitutes  and firms  engage  in Cournot  competition.
26 In the case of Quinolones,  three  of the four patents  were owned  by Japanese  TNCs  and several  analysts
have  pointed  out that  Japanese  firms  decided  to 'drop' the Indian  market  because  of weak patent  protection. See
Redwood  (1994).
19one Indian firm supplied two brands of the same chemical entity. 27 In addition, there were
numerous cases, in which one firm supplied two or more brands of different chemical entities, but
in the same therapeutic group.  Following similar studies, only the tablet forn  and only the most
popular dosage form for each chemical entity was used (Watal, 1998a, and Caves et al., 1991).
However, different package sizes (with the same dosage) were aggregated to compute a single
price and the variables were expressed in single dosage units (instead of packages). Finally,
figures were transformed in terms of their monthly average, since for selected cases, firms entered
the market during 1992. This averaging was possible because the month of entry was listed in the
ORG data. Although one ignores possible seasonal fluctuations by this procedure, it was
preferred to simply excluding these market entrants.
Table 1 lists the 5 different quinolone entities, the patent owner, the year of patent expiry
in Europe, the number of brands supplying the chemical entities, total annual sales, the weighted
average price, and the weighted standard deviation of prices. As can be seen, four on-patent
chemical entities competed with one off-patent chemical entity. The four on-patent chemical
entities accounted for approximately 53 percent of the total sales value of all 24 on-patent
chemical entities identified by Redwood's study.  Table 2 presents the same information for the
group of synthetic hypotensives. In this group, two on-patent chemical entities competed with 9
off-patent drugs. The two on-patent chemical entities accounted for 4 percent in sales of the 24
on-patent drugs identified by Redwood. Note that five off-patent entities were supplied by
monopolists.
As can be seen by comparing Tables 1 and 2, the two therapeutic groups chosen
represent two alternative pre-patent market structures. In the case of quinolones, the on-patent
drugs dominated the market and competed  with only one off-patent drug. The reverse holds for
synthetic hypotensives-the  on-patent drugs had a minority market share and competed with a
large number of off-patent drugs.
27 The  exact  strategy  of supplying  two  brands  of the  same  chemical  entity  remains  a bit  unclear.  One
possible  explanation  is that the two firns previously  experienced  mergers  or acquisitions  and they  prefer  to keep
existing  brands  to maintain  customer  loyalty.
20VI.  Model calibration
To calibrate and simulate the model developed in Section IV, we need to have values for
the elasticities qi,  a,  and E.  Unfortunately, no outside estimate for any of these three
elasticities was available. In principle, one could have tried to estimate values of substitution and
demand elasticities econometrically, but this was ruled out by the lack of availability of time
series data on prices and quantities. Moreover, one would face the standard identification
problem, as data on prices and quantities are simultaneously determined by supply and demand
and it would be difficult to think of effective 'supply-shifting' instruments.
The only additional information available is an estimate of firms' average profit margin.
Based on pharmaceutical companies' annual reports, Redwood (1994) estimates that variable
costs of firms averaged 65 percent of sales, with operating profit margins of 35 percent of sales.
We therefore take the following approach. We assume two alternative values for each of the
three elasticities and evaluate whether or not different combinations of these values are realistic
by comparing the implied average operating margin to the 3  5 percent benchmark.  Obviously,
this approach is far from perfect, but the different assumptions on  i,  or, and e  give a reasonable
indication on how sensitive the simulation results are to these parameters and on the overall
magnitude of the impact of patent protection in the two therapeutic groups.
Since we expect two brands of the same chemical entity to be good substitutes for each
other, we take relatively high values for the substitution elasticity among brands (oi = 3.5 and
oi = 5.5 ).  Note that the two alternative assumptions on Oi apply to all firms in the therapeutic
group. The substitution elasticity among chemical entities is assumed to be comparatively
smaller (a- = 1.1 and a  = 2.0 ).  Finally, for the overall elasticity of demand in the therapeutic
group, we use a low price sensitivity assumption (8 = 1.5)  and high price sensitivity assumption
(8=2.5  ).28
28 In India, only  a small  minority  of the population  is covered  with  health  insurance.  In 1990,  78 percent
of all Indian  health  care spending  was paid for  privately  (World  Bank, 1993).7 With  undeveloped  private  health
insurance  plans,  this implies  that  about three-quarters  of drug  expenditure  are directly  paid by the patients
21With values for Oi, a,  and  -, and the actual data on prices and market shares, we can
use (8) to directly calculate firms' marginal cost of production, ci.  Next, we can compute the
weight parameters wi 1 of the CES function in equation (3).  From (6), it follows that
Djw-0, P  = D. w-i0  P.,O  for allj, z (j  z ),
which can be solved for wL,  . With  E  wi, = I, this leads to:
z=O
WU  = 0  D  +DOiPO-1YD,1I*pi2  (9)
A problem is that the patent holders are not active in the calibrated equilibrium
(Dio = 0).  This would lead to weights wio equal to zero-consumers  do not consider consuming
the TNC' s product if it is not available. For the purpose of this analysis, however, preferences
have to be broader and include the patent holder's product in consumer choice.  Specifically,
consumers must know that the patent holder's product exists and would possibly buy it, if it
would be available. 29 The calibration therefore assumes that the patent holder's brand is, on
average, valued 'like any other brand'.  In computing the weight parameters w. , we therefore set
P,O  equal to the weighted average price of a chemical entity and Dio equal to the average firn
output. 30 This approach is somewhat unsatisfactory, but there does not seem to be a good
alternative.
(Redwood, 1994). One would therefore expect demand for drugs in India to be much more sensitive to price
changes compared to developed countries with comprehensive  health insurance coverage.
29 Since preferences described by a CES function value variety, consumers actually suffer a utility loss
through the unavailability of the patent holder's brand (see Section VIII).
3  Note that this procedure does not change the importance of any two existing Indian brands relative to
each other.  The ratios of any two weight parameters wij and wiz are independent of the inclusion of the patent
holder's product in the preference structure.
22With the obtained values for w1 and equation (3), we can compute figures for the sub-
subutility levels Xi.  Price indices for chemical entities are given by: 31
Pi  =  SW'.  P.1-0i  (10)
j=O 
Next, we calibrate the model at the level of chemical entities by taking parallel steps to
the ones taken at brand level.  First, the weight parameters vi can be computed through:
v  =  [+±D-1I  P§l ED1aPz]  (11)
This allows us to calculate the subutility of the therapeutic group X using equation (2). The price
index of the therapeutic group is given by:
P= [vP  l/  . (12)
Finally, with these values for the subutility level, the overall price index and the
assumption on e, we can solve for the parameter k in the overall demand function in (4).
Table 3 (for quinolones) and Table 4 (for hypotensives) present the calibrated weight
parameters vi for each chemical entity and for the alternative assumptions on Oi and a  (vi is
independent of 8 ).  It is worth pointing out that in both therapeutic groups, there are only small
differences in the values of the weight parameters for the two assumptions on the substitution
elasticity among brands, 4;  the weight parameters are more sensitive to the assumed elasticity of
substitution among chemical entities, a.
To evaluate the plausibility of the assumed elasticities, Tables 5 and 6 present the simple
average and sales-weighted average profit margin in the two therapeutic groups for each
combination of the three elasticities. In the case of quinolones, this profit margin is quite
3'  For a derivation  of the price index  formula,  see Armington  (1969).
23sensitive to the assumed elasticity of substitution among brands (i , but insensitive to the other
two elasticities. For this chemical entity, the assumption (i = 5.5 leads to average profit margins
that lie always below the 35 percent benchmark (both on an unweighted and sales-weighted
basis).  Hence, the assumption (i = 3.5 appears to be more realistic. In the case of hypotensives,
a more mixed picture emerges, although average profit margins are consistently lower for
(i = 5.5 than for (i = 3.5. Again with reference to the 35 percent benchmark, the combination of
(i = 3.5 and a  = 2.0 seems to be the most realistic for this chemical entity.
VII.  Model simulation
In order to simulate the effect of 'overnight' patent protection on the two therapeutic
groups analyzed, we need to have a value for the TNC's marginal cost of production cio.
Because the patent holder is inactive in the calibrated equilibrium, we, again, face again the
problem of requiring data about something which does not exist.  We therefore assume that the
TNC faces the same marginal cost as 'any other Indian firm'.  Specifically, cio is taken to be the
output-weighted average marginal cost of all Indian firms active in the calibrated equilibrium for
the respective chemical entity.  In addition, the simulation assumes that the TNC will become
active once pharmaceutical patent protection is introduced.2
As mentioned in Section IV, we simulate the case whereby the TNC gains a monopoly
for its patented chemical entity (sio = 1 for all on-patent chemical entities). Equilibrium values
for all endogenous variables can be computed using the first order conditions in (8), the demand
function (7), the formulae for the sub-subutilities (3) and subutility (2), and the price indices (10)
and (12). This non-linear system of equations has no analytical solution and, therefore, has to be
solved with a numerical procedure.
It is also desirable to evaluate the effect of patent protection on welfare. We concentrate
on consumer welfare here, because potential changes in producer surplus are hard to evaluate
without any information on Indian firms' fixed costs.  In addition, although we assume a fixed
24number of firms supplying off-patent chemical entities in the simulation, it is more likely that
changes in market condition result in entry or exit. This claim is supported by the low actual
profitability observed in the industry.
As for consumer welfare, the quasi-linear utility function in (1) implies the following
indirect utility function:
V(P,Py,I)=  +L[P  - 1+  (13)
where I denotes overall income of patients requiring medical treatment with a drug of the
therapeutic group. We can compute compensating variations, i.e. the additional income needed to
make consumers as well off after patent introduction as before patent protection, by using the two
different values for the price index P  from the calibrated and simulated equilibria and computing
the change in the term AP-'  / (S  - 1)  .33
VIII.  Simulation results
The simulation results for the alternative assumptions on the three elasticities are
presented in Table 7 for the four on-patent quinolones and in Table 8 for the two on-patent
hypotensives. The tables present percentage price increases and the TNC's operating profit,
which would result from overnight patent protection. Price increases are computed relative to the
weighted average prices listed in Tables 1 and 2.  Figures for TNC profits are on a monthly
basis. 34
As can be seen in the tables, price increases and TNC profits vary widely depending on
the assumptions of demand and substitution elasticities. Several general observations can be
32 Theoretically,  it is possible  that  the  patent  holder's  monopoly  profits  are  not  sufficient  to cover  its  fixed
costs  Fio  of doing  business  in India.
3  Theoretically,  it is possible  that  the  patent  holder's  monopoly  profits  are  not  sufficient  to cover  his  fixed
costs  Fio  of doing  business  in India.
3  Simulation  results  for  the  off-patent  chemical  entities  as well  as figures  for  changes  in subutility  levels
and  price  indices  are  suppressed,  as  they  would  add  little  information.
25made, however. To begin with, a larger value for the substitution elasticity among brands, Ai,
implies larger price movements. This is due to a more competitive pre-patent market structure
that prevails if brands are better substitutes for one another. The main determinant of price
changes, however, is the elasticity of substitution between chemical entities, cr.  For all on-patent
chemical entities, the percentage price increases for a = 1.1  exceed several times the percentage
increases for a- = 2.0.  This result supports the frequent claim that 'effective' competition from
therapeutic substitutes limits 'excessive' prices of on-patent drugs.
For the group of quinolones, a somewhat surprising result is that, for  C = 1.1,  the
percentage price increases of on-patent chemical entities with a smaller number of imitating
brands in the pre-patent market structure exceed those with a larger number of brands. The
explanation for this result is that the drugs with the larger number of pre-patent brands also have a
larger share of the therapeutic group's market. By inspection of the pricing formula (8), it
follows that the patent holder's sales decision puts a relative greater emphasis on the overall
demand elasticity, s, in the therapeutic group. If cr  < e,  this has a relative offsetting effect on
the patent holder's operating profit margin vis-a-vis chemical entities with a smaller market share
in the therapeutic group. It turns out that for a = 1.1,  this offsetting effect is large enough to lead
to a smaller percentage price increase, despite the fact that there is a larger number of imitating
brands in the pre-patent market equilibrium.
Does stronger therapeutic competition, as reflected by a larger value of a,  lower the
profits of the patent holders? Not necessarily. Consider, for example, the case of ofloxacin in
Table 7.  For all combinations of Ai  and  £,  profits are higher under more intense therapeutic
competition (ac = 2.0).  Although patent protection raises ofloxacin's price, under strong
therapeutic competition it experiences increased demand as prices for other on-patent chemical
entities also rise.  This demand shift is due to the particular properties of the CES subutility
function in (2) combined with the fact that ofloxacin was calibrated as relatively unimportant in
consumer preferences, as reflected by its low values for vi in Table 3.
But another mechanism is at work. Consider the case of ciprofloxacin in Table 7. For a
demand elasticity of  £  =  2.5, profits are higher under more intense therapeutic competition. In
26this case, it cannot be due to a demand shift, as ciprofloxacin was calibrated as relatively
important in consumer preferences as reflected by its high values for vi in Table 3.  Instead, lower
profits are due to the 'mistakes' patent holders commit by taking other firms' sales decisions as
given. In the specific case of ciprofloxacin and the assumed elasticities, the cost of this 'mistake'
can outweigh the benefit of lower therapeutic competition.
In sum, a variety of forces is at work with regard to TNC profits. By comparing the
simulation results for the on-patent quinolones to the results for the on-patent hypotensives,
however, one can still draw a useful conclusion. If the number and weight of off-patent chemical
entities is significant-as  is the case for hypotensives-a  higher degree of therapeutic
competition is likely to lead to lower TNC profits, as demand unambiguously shifts from on-
patent to off-patent chemical entities. In addition, overall profit levels depend significantly on the
elasticity of demand E.  If the therapeutic group is highly sensitive to price movements (6 = 2.5),
profits are lower than if demand is inelastic (E = 1.5  )-as  expected.
It is interesting to use the simulation results to ask the hypothetical question: would
product patent protection in India lead to accelerated R&D by TNCs and consequently to a
greater rate of drug discovery (particular for the type of diseases most prevalent in low-income
countries like India)?  Consider again the case of ciprofloxacin and assume the more realistic
Ai  = 3.5.  Under the most favorable circumstances, the patent owner realizes operating profits
equal to 134.2 million Rs. or around US$ 5.2 million (on an annual basis). 35 In the worst case
scenario, the TNC only makes profits of 17.7 million Rs. or US$ 0.7 million. Note that the
TNC's fixed costs of doing business in India still need to be subtracted from these figures, so
available revenue for R&D is likely to be much smaller.
One estimate puts the direct and indirect cost over a ten-year time period of developing a
new drug at US$231 million (OPPI, 1994b). Annual profits of US$ 5.2 million would seem quite
significant in this context, especially for a low-income country like India and if one allows for the
possibility that R&D could be performed less expensively in India. However, the amount of
3  To convert rupees into U.S. dollars the average 1992 exchange rate from the IMF's International
Financial Statistics was used:  25.918 Rs. per US$.
27money available for R&D is likely to be smaller than US$ 5.2 million annually. In addition,
ciprofloxacin was one of the best selling drugs on the Indian market in 1992. Hypothetical
profits are therefore likely to be much smaller for other on-patent chemical entities than in the
case of ciprofloxacin. Notwithstanding, one cannot dismiss the possibility that, in the long term,
patent protection in India could affect private R&D decisions and contribute to new drug
discoveries-especially  against diseases particular to developing countries. 36
Finally, Tables 9 and 10 present the simulated static consumer welfare losses for the two
therapeutic groups, which are expressed as compensating variations. As one would expect,
welfare losses are smaller the more price-elastic is overall demand in the therapeutic group and
the higher the degree of substitutability among chemical entities. The latter effect is relatively
more pronounced in the case of hypotensives, because the presence of a larger off-patent market
segment makes therapeutic competition more effective.
The figures shown seem very high in relation to TNCs' profits. 37 Taking the case of
quinolones, for example, welfare losses on an annual basis range from 744.2 million Rs. (US$
28.7 million) to 1,810.4 million Rs. (US$ 69.9 million)-again  assuming the more realistic
X  = 3.5. These large figures are due to the properties of the CES sub-subutility function in (3).
Specifically, the compensating variations capture not only the traditional deadweight loss due to
higher prices, but also the loss in product variety, as far as consumers cannot choose any more
among different brands for on-patent chemical entities once patents are introduced.
IX.  Summary of main findings
This study has simulated the effects of the introduction of product patent protection on
two therapeutic drug groups in the Indian pharmacy market.  Such an analysis is of interest as
India will have to amend its current patent regime in this regard by 2005 and until then, establish
36CurTently,  only  a very small  portion  of worldwide  R&D  is spent  on diseases  prevalent  in developing
countries  and  most of it is conducted  by publicly-funded  organizations  or the military  in the developed  world  (see
Lanjouw,  1997).
37 The figures  are also  much higher  than estimated  welfare  losses  in Watal  (1  998a).
28a transitional regime which would allow the filing of patent applications for newly developed
drugs and grant exclusive marketing rights to such drugs.
The usefulness of a simulation of overnight patent protection is limited for several
reasons.  First, the introduction of patent protection for pharmaceutical products as spelled-out in
the TRIPS Agreement does not extend to drugs which are already on the market, i.e. there is no
obligation for 'pipeline' protection of pharmaceutical products. This implies that the six on-
patent drugs examined in this paper indeed will never receive patent protection in India. It is
worth emphasizing that the introduction of pharmaceutical product patent protection as required
by the TRIPS Agreement will lead neither to actual price increases nor to the direct displacement
of Indian imitators.  For any newly developed chemical entity, protection applies from the first
day on the market.
Second, it was necessary to make strong assumptions on the weight of the TNC's
product in the demand function and the TNC's marginal costs of production.  The simulation
suffered from inadequate data with regard to demand and substitution elasticities. Moreover, the
neglect of potential licensing activity may have biased the calibrated and simulated equilibria.
Third, it was assumed that all other market conditions remain equal. This is clearly a
simplification. For example, stronger patent protection may induce the Indian government to
impose price controls or grant compulsory licenses.
These reservations notwithstanding, the simulation highlights some relevant variables
that are likely to determine the impact of pharmaceutical patent protection in India on prices,
TNC profits, and welfare.  Specifically, it clearly demonstrated the relevance of therapeutic
competition.  The availability of close, off-patent therapeutic substitutes can restrain prices and
limit potential welfare losses. To put it differently, if future drug discoveries are mainly new
varieties of already existing therapeutic treatments, the impact is likely to be relatively small. If
newly discovered drugs are medicinal breakthroughs, however, prices may be significantly above
competitive levels and static welfare losses relatively large.
From the viewpoint of TNCs, potential profits depended crucially on the overall price
elasticity in the therapeutic group. If demand is highly price-elastic, as one may expect in a low-
29income country with limited insurance coverage, TNC profits are likely to be small. However, if
one takes into account the possibility that future changes in the Indian health care system, such as
the opening of medical insurance provision to private competition (Lanjouw 1997), may reduce
the price sensitivity of demand, patent holders' profits could increase substantially.
The lack of reliable estimates for structural model parameters and the wide variations in
simulated profit levels precluded an assessment of whether the introduction of patent protection
in India will boost R&D activity of transnational corporation and lead to an acceleration in the
rate of new drug discovery. In the long run, it is possible that TNCs will do more research on, for
example, tropical diseases, given that most developing countries will move toward stronger
patent rights in a post-TRIPS world.
From the viewpoint of Indian consumers, the simulated welfare losses in this study were
quite large-in  part due to a loss in brand variety implied by the CES sub-subutility function.
However, it needs to be emphasized that, as of 1993, the patented market segment in India
accounted for only 10.9 percent of the total sales values of the Top-500 pharmaceutical products
in India. Moreover, the Indian Government will have some flexibility in restraining high prices
through the grant of compulsory licenses and price controls-as  long as these regulations are in
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
30Appendix
This appendix derives the first order condition (8) that result from firms' profit
maximizing behavior.  From (4), (5), and (7), we obtain the following implicit demand functions:
I  1
P=  k6 D  -,  (A.1)
I  o-e  1 
g  1  0  g-£ I  -
Pi  vik  OP  O-  Di  a,  (A.2)
ai  I  ^-  ,-
Pii  v,A  w. k Oi  P  0, Pi 0, D,)i0  . (A.3)
Differentiating (A. 1) with respect to  D, (A.2) with respect to  Di and (A.3) with respect to  D
yields
'P  I  P
oD  £ D'
oT,  1  Pi  a  - Pi  oP  dD
__  __I  +  I(A.5) +  _ _+
&D,  a Di  a  P  dD dDi,
_P#  _  i  4  PY +  5  -Pv  J  iqc9  -6P#  dP  dD1,9Di
_]  - i  D-ij  L  Pi  di  P  dDdDi(A.6)
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The changes in the subutility level and sub-subutility levels can be computed directly from (2)
and (3):
cr-i
c9D =- v1D,  D  t  D  (A.7)
dD,  nvDia-'  Di  Di
Z=O
31Q,-1
c9D  W  w..Dij  Di  Di
e9Dy m,  __  = Si.  (A.8)
z=O
Using these two partial derivatives and substituting (A.4) and (A.5) into (A.6), we can compute
the inverse demand elasticity perceived by the firm supplying brandj:
dPi Dii  1-s,  sj(I-ti)  sijti.  (A.9)
M,V PY  oi  £
Next, we consider brand k of chemical entity i, which is supplied by the same firm that supplies
brandj.  Differentiating k's demand function
a*  I  a-e  -au  1
Pik =  V  Wikk  P  Pi  Dik  (A.10)
with respect to D.  yields
O'Pik =O0i  0-  Pik  0P  +  _  ff-  Pik  0  D1di(  1
'Sij  l  Qi  Pi xi  QiP  DdiJDj
Using the above partial derivatives, we can compute the inverse cross-demand elasticity:
Oyik  Du  Il  1-t,  til
aDij  Pik  LQi  ff  £  Sul*  (A. 12)
Finally, we consider the brand of chemical entity I that is produced by the same firm that supplies
brandj of chemical entity i. Differentiating the demand function
a  I  Z-e  ,Q-G  1
P 1. =-v,w,k#P  k  '  P 1 P'  D,)'  (A.13)
with respect to Di, yields
32O'P,.  F*-CC-g  a-  ePl.  dP  dD  i D,
dDij  - o  ff  ,  j  pJdDedDi  (A.14) dD..  0  a  AijP  9DeD,  ?Du
which leads to the following inverse cross-demand elasticity:
9p 1 . =Dy  (A.15)
Now consider profits ;T. of the firm that supplies brandj of chemical entity i.  These are given by
)ij  = DU,(P%  -cU)+Di,k(Pik  Cik)+  Dl(P  -C  c).  (A.16)
kI
Coumot behavior with respect to brandj of chemical entity i leads to the following first order
condition:
P~~+D  ±~~~D 1 k  Ik0,~=U  (A.  17) Pj +Di  +  E  Dik  + E  D,  =
Using the demand elasticities in (A.9), (A.12), and (A.15) and the fact that  X  D. Pz = D,P,
(A.  17) can be transforned into condition (8), as stated in the text.  It is left to the reader to show
that Bertrand behavior leads to the same first order condition.
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36Table  1:  Quinolones-Overview
Weighted
Year of  Number of  Weighted  standard
patent  brands in  Total sales  average  deviation of
Chemical entity  Patent owner  expiry  India  ('000 Rs.)  price (Rs.)  prices
Ciprofloxacin  Bayer AG  2001  37  555,515  17.63  1.23
Norfloxacin  Kyorin & Roger  1998  24  467,238  4.43  0.63
Bellon/Dainippon
Pefloxacin  Roger Bellon/  1998  8  125,370  8.92  0.68
Dainippon
Ofloxacin  Daiichi Seiyaku Co.  2001  2  48,778  20.01  0.35
Nalidixic Acid  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  4  69,260  0.93  0.08
Notes:  The patent owners were inactive in the Indian market for all five on-patent chemical entities.  Figures are for
1992.
Source:  Redwood (1994), Operations Research Group (1992), and The Merck Index (1989).
37Table 2:  Hypotensives-Overview
Weighted
Year of  Number of  Weighted  standard
patent  brands in  Total sales  average  deviation of
Chemical entity  Patent owner  expiry  India  ('000 Rs.)  price (Rs.)  prices
Enalapril maleate  Merck & Co.  1999  14  67,639  1.19  0.12
Captopril  Squibb  1997  5  36,591  2.18  0.10
Nifedipine/  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  12  66,064  1.70  0.22
Atenolol
Methyldopa  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  8  56,920  1.59  0.21
Lisinopril  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  9  10,260  2.46  0.21
Clonidine  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  2  8,518  0.36  0.06
Indapamide  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  1  7,609  2.52  n.a.
Prazosin  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  1  3,130  0.92  n.a.
Perindopril  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  1  1,156  16.22  n.a
Hydralazine  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  1  765  0.07  n.a
Reserpine  (off-patent)  (off-patent)  1  237  0.13  n.a
Notes:  The patent owners were inactive in the Indian market for both on-patent chemical entities.  Figures are for
1992.
Source:  Redwood (1994), Operations Research Group (1992), and The Merck Index (1989).
38Table 3:  Quinolones-Calibrated  Weight Parameters
q3 =  3.5  q$ = 5.5
V.  Vi  V.  Vj
Chemical entity  (r=  1.1)  (  = 2.0)  (=  1.1)  (  = 2.0)
Ciprofloxacin  0.463  0.587  0.464  0.592
Norfloxacin  0.332  0.213  0.333  0.216
Pefloxacin  0.118  0.117  0.118  0.114
Ofloxacin  0.042  0.067  0.042  0.062
Nalidixic Acid  0.044  0.017  0.044  0.017
Notes:  Variables are explained in the text.  Weights may not exactly sum up to one due to rounding errors.
39Table 4: Hypotensives-Calibrated  Weight Parameters
oi  3.5  Xi =5-5
Vj  Vi  V.  Vj
Chemical entity  (Cf=1.1)  (ar= 2.0)  (or = 1.)  (or= 2.0)
Enalapril maleate  0.259  0.232  0.259  0.232
Captopril  0.142  0.146  0.142  0.145
Nifedipine/Atenolol  0.256  0.247  0.256  0.248
Methyldopa  0.207  0.157  0.208  0.163
Lisinopril  0.052  0.110  0.052  0.110
Clonidine  0.030  0.019  0.029  0.018
Indapamide  0.030  0.035  0.030  0.033
Prazosin  0.012  0.014  0.012  0.013
Perindopril  0.007  0.036  0.007  0.034
Hydralazine  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002
Reserpine  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
Notes:  Variables are explained in the text. Weights may not exactly sum up to one due to rounding errors.
40Table 5:  Quinolones-Average  Profit Margins
=1.5  =2.5
o=l.l  a=2.0  a=l.1  =2.0
,p = 3.5  32.1  30.6  31.3  29.7
(40.3)  (35.4)  (37.2)  (32.4)
q 5 = 5.5  22.5  20.9  21.6  20.1
(32.3)  (27.5)  (29.2)  (24.4)
Notes: Sales-weighted  averages  are in parentheses.  Figures  are expressed  in percentage  values.
Table 6: Hypotensives -Average  Profit Margins
6=1.5  6=2.5
cr=1.l  =2.0  =1.1  o=2.0
qi = 3.5  40.3  33.4  39.5  32.6
(54.7)  (39.7)  (52.4)  (37.4)
o, =  5.  32.0  25.0  31.2  24.2
(49.0)  (34.0)  (46.7)  (31.7)
Notes:  Sales-weighted averages are in parentheses. Figures are expressed in percentage values.
41Table 7:  Quinolones-Simulation
8=1.5  8=2.5
=1.1  a=2.0  a=1.1  =2.0
Price  TNC  Price  TNC  Price  TNC  Price  TNC
increase  profit (in  increase  profit (in  increase  profit (in  increase  profit (in
(in %)  '000 Rs.)  (in %)  '000 Rs.)  (in %)  '000 Rs.)  (in %)  '000 Rs.)
'A  =3.5
Ciprofloxacin  233.5  11,185  45.8  8,171  119.1  1,474  30.8  2,075
Norfloxacin  251.5  9,643  43.2  8,269  140.9  1,303  29.5  2,081
Pefloxacin  353.0  3,400  35.6  4,210  267.6  493  27.3  1,094
Ofloxacin  318.6  1,189  20.6  2,603  308.5  173  21.0  652
'A  = 5.5
Ciprofloxacin  276.7  13,845  68.4  11,646  145.7  2,773  45.8  4,155
Norfloxacin  297.9  11,855  63.6  10,968  170.9  2,437  44.4  3,879
Pefloxacin  416.5  4,100  50.6  4,664  319.5  905  41.9  1,694
Ofloxacin  370.5  1,401  30.0  2,312  357.2  311  31.5  811
Notes:  The price increase refers to the difference between the TNC's price under patent protection and the weighted
average price of all suppliers in the absence of patent protection. The figures for TNC profits are on a monthly
basis.
42Table  8:  Hypotensives-Simulation
g=1.5  g=25
o=1.1  cr=2.0  c=1.1  a=2.0
Price  TNC  Price  TNC  Price  TNC  Price  TNC
increase  profit (in  increase  profit (in  increase  profit (in  increase  profit (in
(in %)  '000 Rs.)  (in %)  '000 Rs.)  (in °/O)  '000 Rs.)  (in %)  '000 Rs.)
Ai  = 3.5
Enalapril  285.4  2,807  32.5  909  179.7  1,396  30.0  645
maleate
Captopril  142.3  1,676  12.4  860  105.6  849  12.5  600
Ai  =5.5
Enalapril  333.0  3,027  49.6  1,260  211.3  1,680  43.7  955
maleate
Captopril  166.4  1,780  19.3  1,051  123.9  1,009  18.0  783
Notes:  The price increase refers to the difference  between the TNC's price under patent protection and the weighted
average price of all suppliers in the absence of patent protection. The figures for TNC profits are on a monthly
basis.
43Table 9:  Quinolones-Simulated  Consumer Welfare Losses
e =  1.5  E=225
ao=1.1  a=2.0  a=1.1  ar=2.0
,jj = 3.5  150,867  107,167  68,921  62,015
S. = 5.5  135,993  88,185  66,025  55,020
Notes:  Figures shown are compensating variations (in thousands of Rupees), i.e. the additional income consumers
would need to be as well off after patent introduction as before patent introduction.  Figures are on a monthly basis.
Table 10: Hypotensives-Simulated  Consumer Welfare Losses
=1.5  6=25
o=1.1  cr=2.0  a =1.1  a =2.0
os = 3.5  14,203  6,413  9,398  5,359
oi = 5.5  12,632  5,232  8,486  4,449
Notes:  Figures shown are compensating variations (in thousands of Rupees), i.e. the additional income consumers
would need to be as well off after patent introduction as before patent introduction.  Figures are on a monthly basis.
44Figure 1: Pharmaceutical Demand-A  Two-Stage Decision-Making Process
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